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(Self-­‐)Selection,	   Incentives	   and	   Resources	   –	   a	   Personnel	   Economics	  
Perspective	  on	  Academia	  and	  Higher	  Education	  
Kerstin	  Pull	  and	  Uschi	  Backes-­‐Gellner	  	  
Abstract	  In	  our	  paper,	  we	  view	  academia	   from	  a	  personnel	   economics	  perspective	   and	  analyze	  three	   important	  questions:	   (1)	  Who	  decides	   to	  become	  a	   researcher	  and	  what	  are	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  selection	  and	  self-­‐selection	  that	  drive	  this	  process?	  (2)	  What	  makes	  re-­‐searchers	   stay	   motivated	   and	   how	   can	   they	   be	   incentivized?	   (3)	   What	   other	   factors,	  aside	  from	  incentives,	  determine	  a	  researcher’s	  productivity?	  In	  our	  selective	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  we	  show	  how	  personnel	  economics	  has	  contributed	  and	  may	  further	  con-­‐tribute	  to	  an	  enhanced	  understanding	  of	   the	  functioning	  of	   the	  academic	  system.	  First,	  however,	   we	   elaborate	   on	   a	   researcher’s	   outcome	   dimensions,	   why	   these	   need	   to	   be	  measured	  by	  adequate	  output	  indicators	  and	  why	  differing	  inputs	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  Here,	   too,	  personnel	   economics	  may	   contribute	   since	   it	   highlights	   the	  virtues	  and	  potential	  pitfalls	  associated	  with	  the	  identification	  of	  relevant	  outcome	  dimensions	  and	  potential	  measurement	  problems,	  and	  since	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  assess	  productivity.	  	  
(Self-­‐)Selection,	   Incentives	   and	   Resources	   –	   a	   Personnel	   Economics	  
Perspective	  on	  Academia	  and	  Higher	  Education	  
Kerstin	  Pull	  and	  Uschi	  Backes-­‐Gellner	  	  
1. Introduction	  Viewing	  academia	   from	  a	  personnel	  economics	  perspective	  means	   focusing	  on	   its	  per-­‐sonnel,	  i.e.,	  its	  human	  resources.	  Although	  many	  different	  groups	  of	  employees	  contrib-­‐ute	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  academic	  system,	  researchers	  arguably	  make	  up	  the	  group	  that	  is	  the	  most	  important.	  From	  a	  personnel	  economics	  perspective,	  the	  following	  ques-­‐tions	  concerning	  this	  important	  group	  of	  personnel	  arise:	  	  (1) Who	  decides	  to	  become	  a	  researcher?	  What	  are	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  selection	  and	  self-­‐selection	  that	  drive	  this	  process?	  What	  are	  the	  intended	  and	  potentially	  unin-­‐tended	  side	  effects?	  (2) What	  makes	  researchers	  stay	  motivated?	  How	  can	  they	  be	  incentivized?	  Do	  they	  need	  to	  be	  incentivized?	  (3) What	  other	  factors	  –	  aside	  from	  incentives	  –	  determine	  a	  researcher’s	  productivi-­‐ty?	  What	  can	  be	  done	  to	  enhance	  a	  researcher’s	  productivity?	  What	  can	  be	  done	  in	   terms	   of	   training	   and	   development?	  What	   can	   be	   done	   on	   an	   organizational	  level?	  In	  our	  selective	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  we	  will	  investigate	  these	  three	  sets	  of	  questions	  and	  show	  how	  personnel	  economics	  has	  contributed	  and	  may	  further	  contribute	  to	  an	  enhanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  academic	  system.	  However,	  we	  must	  first	  elaborate	  on	  the	  more	  fundamental	  question	  of	  what	  researchers	  in	  academia	  actu-­‐ally	  do,	  or	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	  what	  they	  should	  be	  doing.	  That	  is,	  we	  need	  to	  define	  their	  relevant	  outcome	  dimensions	  and	  how	  these	  might	  or	  should	  be	  measured	  by	  adequate	  output	   indicators.	   Furthermore,	  we	  must	   also	   take	   into	   account	   differing	   inputs	   in	   an	  attempt	  to	  measure	  productivity,	  and	  not	  simply	  outputs,	  before	  we	  can	  consider	  how	  to	  incentivize	  researchers	   (question	  set	  2)	  or	  how	  to	  select	   the	   “best”	   researchers	  (ques-­‐tion	  set	  1)	  and	  how	  to	  adequately	  support	   them	  (question	  set	  3).	  Here,	   too,	  personnel	  economics	  may	  contribute	  because	  it	  highlights	  the	  virtues	  and	  potential	  pitfalls	  associ-­‐ated	  with	  the	  identification	  of	  relevant	  outcome	  dimensions	  and	  potential	  measurement	  problems,	  and	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  assess	  productivity.	  	  Our	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  addresses	  the	  relevant	  outcome	  dimensions	  in	  academia	  and	  the	  associated	  measurement	  problems	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  output	  indicators.	  Section	  3	  describes	  the	  process	  from	  output	  to	  productivity	  meas-­‐urement.	  Section	  4	  highlights	  the	  selection	  and	  self-­‐selection	  processes	  into	  the	  academ-­‐ic	  system	  and	  hints	  at	  potentially	  unintended	  effects.	  Section	  5	  focuses	  on	  incentives	  in	  the	  academic	  system	  and	  how	  these	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  the	  new	  public	  management	  reforms.	  Again,	  a	  personnel	  economics	  perspective	  highlights	  the	  potential	  negative	  side	  effects	  associated	  with	   the	  reforms.	  Section	  6	  highlights	  other	  drivers	  of	   research	  per-­‐formance	   and	   concentrates	   on	   human,	   social	   and	   organizational	   capital	   as	   important	  resources.	  Section	  7	  concludes	  the	  paper.	  
2. Defining	  the	  Relevant	  Outcomes	  in	  Academia	  and	  Searching	  for	  Adequate	  Out-­‐
put	  Indicators	  As	  PULL	  (2009)	  has	  argued,	  researchers	  in	  universities	  basically	  produce	  three	  different	  outcomes:	  (i)	  they	  undertake	  research	  and	  publish	  their	  results,	  (ii)	  they	  teach	  and	  (iii)	  they	  serve	  their	  scientific	  community	  by,	  for	  example,	  taking	  posts	  as	  deans	  and	  review-­‐ing	  the	  work	  of	  peers.1	  A	  university	  researcher’s	  job	  can	  thus	  be	  characterized	  as	  what	  would	  typically	  be	  called	  “multi-­‐tasking.”	  From	  a	  personnel	  economics	  perspective,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  measure	  a	  researcher’s	  outcome,	  (a)	  one	  has	  to	  measure	  it	  in	  every	  relevant	  dimension	  and	  (b)	  one	  has	  to	  measure	  it	  adequately	   to	  avoid	  producing	  adverse	  effects.	  This	  is	  true	  not	  only	  if	  incentives	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  output	  measurement	  but	  also	  if	  it	  is	  “only”	  measurement	  as	  such.	  SCHNEIDER	  (2007)	  convincingly	  shows	  for	  judges	  in	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board	  in	  the	  US,	  measurement	  per	  se	  might	   itself	  have	  behavioral	  consequences.	  	  If	   it	   is	  measurement	  per	  se	   that	  matters,	  then,	  as	  PULL	  (2009)	  highlights,	  (a)	  measuring	  only	   one	   dimension	   of	   a	   researchers’	   outcome	  will	   inevitably	   attract	   the	   researcher’s	  attention	  to	  this	  one	  outcome	  dimension	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  unbalanced	  outcome	  port-­‐folio.	  For	  example,	  if	  only	  the	  research	  outcome	  is	  measured	  by	  a	  corresponding	  output	  indicator,	  and	  teaching	  and	  service	  outcomes	  are	  not	  measured,	   then	  a	  researcher	  will	  focus	  on	  his	  or	  her	  research	  activities	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  teaching	  activities	  and	  services	  to	   the	   scientific	   community.	  This	  unintended	   side	  effect	  of	  measuring	   (and	  potentially	  even	   incentivizing)	   only	   one	   of	   several	   relevant	   outcome	   dimensions	   is	   a	   straightfor-­‐ward	   application	   of	   the	  well-­‐known	   “equal	   compensation	   principle”	   in	   personnel	   eco-­‐nomics	  (MILGROM/ROBERTS	  1992,	  STADLER	  2003).	  The	  argument	  going	  beyond	  the	  equal	  compensation	  principle	   is	  that	  even	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  explicit	   incen-­‐tives	  tied	  to	  the	  output	  measurement,	  if	  the	  measurement	  is	  made	  public	  and	  may	  hence	  affect	   a	   researcher’s	   reputation,	   then	   a	   one-­‐dimensional	  measurement	  will	   potentially	  lead	  to	  an	  unintended	  concentration	  on	  the	  measured	  outcome	  dimension.	  Although	  the	  equal	   compensation	   principle	   and	   the	   above-­‐derived	   generalized	   implication	   are	   only	  valid	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  employee’s	  effort	  cost	  function	  is	  characterized	  by	  per-­‐fect	  substitutability	  in	  effort	  costs	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  different	  tasks	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  (i.e.,	  where	  there	  are	  no	  complementarities	  between	  the	  different	  outcomes),	  SLIWKA	  (2010)	  has	   shown	   that	   in	   cases	   where	   there	   is	   no	   perfect	   substitutability	   in	   effort	   costs	   (as	  might	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  researchers	  in	  academia;	  see	  below),	  there	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  “similar	  compensation”	  for	  the	  different	  outcome	  dimensions.	  That	  is,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  academia,	   there	  would	   also	  need	   to	   be	   similar	   public	   recognition	   for	   teaching	   and	   for	  services	   to	   the	   scientific	   community,	   and	   if	   there	   is	   not,	   outcome	  measures	   are	   ineffi-­‐cient	  at	  best	  or	  may	  cause	  negative	  side	  effects.	  Furthermore,	  as	  PULL	  (2009)	  emphasizes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  different	  out-­‐come	  dimensions	  are	  adequately	  measured	  with	  the	  help	  of	  appropriate	  output	  indica-­‐tors	   (b).	   In	   spite	   of	   the	  many	   and	   substantial	   problems	   associated	  with	   the	   adequate	  measurement	  of	  research	  activities,	  it	  is	  still	  much	  easier	  to	  at	  least	  find	  proxies	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  research	  than	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  teaching	  outcomes	  or	  of	  services	  to	  the	  scientific	  community.	  A	  researcher’s	  research	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  counting	  publi-­‐cations	  and	  adjusting	  for	  page	  lengths	  and/or	  for	  the	  number	  of	  coauthors	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  assess	  the	  quantity	  dimension	  of	  research.	  One	  can	  also	  try	  to	  assess	  the	  quality	  di-­‐mension	  of	  research	  by	  counting	  citations	  or	  by	  assessing	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  journals	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Further,	  researchers	  are	  expected	  to	  advise	  politicians	  and	  practitioners	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  research	  and	  –	  
depending	  on	  their	  field	  –	  also	  to	  engage	  in	  technology	  transfer.	  
which	  the	  researchers’	  papers	  have	  been	  published.	  Although	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  vari-­‐ous	  proxies	  is	  a	  much-­‐discussed	  topic	  (in	  the	  scientific	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	  appointment	  committees),	   there	   is	  at	   least	  an	  idea	  of	  and	  a	  discus-­‐sion	  about	  how	  research	  might	  be	  assessed.	  This	  situation	  is	  very	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  teaching	  outcomes	  or	  of	  services	  to	  the	  scientific	  community.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  teaching,	  PULL	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  evaluators	  would	  like	  to	  know	  wheth-­‐er	   and	  how	  a	   lecturer	   contributes	   to	   preparing	   a	   student	   for	   the	   different	   tasks	   (s)he	  might	  have	  to	  perform	  in	  later	   life,	  be	  they	  in	  business,	  academia,	  politics	  or	  society.	  A	  good	  teacher	  might	  even	  help	  a	  student	  determine	  the	  fields	  to	  which	  (s)he	  can	  contrib-­‐ute	  most.	  Obviously,	   this	  potential	  outcome	  of	   teaching	  can	  hardly	  be	  assessed.	  Asking	  the	  alumni	  will	  not	  really	  help:	  first,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ask	  the	  relevant	  questions,	  and	  second,	  it	  will	  obviously	  not	  be	  possi-­‐ble	  to	  trace	  an	  alumnus’s	  career	  success	  back	  to	  a	  single	  lecturer	  or	  even	  a	  single	  course.	  One	  might	  be	  able	  to	  learn	  something	  about	  the	  comparative	  success	  of	  different	  study	  programs	  at	  different	  institutions	  (assuming	  that	  teaching	  is	  a	  team	  production).	  How-­‐ever,	  even	  then,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  account	  for	  (and	  econometrically	  control	  for)	  differ-­‐ent	  starting	  conditions,	  such	  as	  different	  student	  populations,	  regionally	  different	  labor	  market	  conditions	  and	  different	  financial	  resources	  and	  constraints.	  Provided	  one	  actu-­‐ally	  managed	  to	  measure	  team	  teaching	  performance,	  one	  would	  still	  not	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	   assess	   an	   individual	   lecturer’s	   contribution	   to	   this	   teaching	   performance.	   In	   fact,	  measuring	  (and	  potentially	  then	  also	  incentivizing)	  teaching	  performance	  on	  a	  team	  lev-­‐el	  might	  result	   in	  the	  well-­‐known	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  highlighted	   in	  the	  personnel	  eco-­‐nomics	   literature.	  Using	   student	  evaluations	  as	  another	  potential	   indicator	  of	   teaching	  quality	  is,	  unfortunately,	  no	  alternative	  because	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  these	  evaluations	  are	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  lecturer’s	  (physical)	  attractiveness	  and	  by	  whether	  the	  con-­‐tent	   of	   the	   course	   is	   judged	   to	   be	   difficult	   or	   easy	   to	   understand	   (see,	   e.g.,	   FEL-­‐TON/MITCHELL/STINSON	  2004).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  better	  grades	  in	  student	  evalua-­‐tions,	  a	  lecturer	  might	  hence	  be	  tempted	  to	  lower	  the	  course	  requirements	  by,	  e.g.,	  only	  teaching	   very	   simple	  models.	   Alternatives	   such	   as	   standardizing	   course	   contents	   and	  introducing	   central	   exams	   (as	   has	   been	   propagated	   for	   schools,	   see,	   e.g.,	   WOESSMANN	  2005)	  are	  not	  available,	  given	  the	  constitutionally	  granted	  freedom	  of	  teaching	  and	  re-­‐search.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  adequately	  measure	  teaching	  quality,	  and	   hence,	   university	   professors	   should	   not	   be	   incentivized	   in	   this	   respect.	  Not	   being	  able	   to	   adequately	  measure	   teaching	  outcomes	   implies	   abstaining	   from	  measuring	   re-­‐search	  outcomes	  –	  unless	  there	  are	  non-­‐negligible	  complementarities	  between	  research	  and	  teaching.	  If	  HUMBOLDT	  was	  right	  (and	  empirical	  analyses	  by	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/ZANDER	  1989	   show	   this	   to	   be	   the	   case	   for	   advanced	   teaching;	   see	   below),	   then	  measuring	   re-­‐search	   outcomes	   only	  would	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   bad	   teaching	   (at	   least	   not	   at	   the	  graduate	  level)	  but	  would	  result	  in	  a	  researcher’s	  focus	  of	  attention	  shifting	  to	  research	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   teaching	  undergraduates	  and	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  serving	  the	  academic	  community.	  	  Concerning	  the	  measurement	  of	  services	  to	  the	  scientific	  community,	  the	  situation	  at	  first	  would	  seem	  rather	  unproblematic,	  given	  that	  it	   is	  easy	  to	  assess,	   for	  example,	  whether	  and	  for	  how	  long	  a	  researcher	  has	  held	  a	  post	  as	  a	  dean	  or	  vice-­‐president,	  whether	  and	  for	   how	   long	   a	   researcher	   has	   served	   on	   the	   editorial	   board	   of	   a	   scientific	   journal	   or	  whether	   and	   how	   often	   a	   researcher	   has	   organized	   a	   scientific	   conference	   (see	   PULL	  2009).	  However,	  how	  much	  (s)he	  actually	  worked	  in	  the	  respective	  job,	  how	  much	  effort	  and	  time	  (s)he	  put	  in	  and	  whether	  (s)he	  succeeded	  and	  actually	  advanced	  the	  respective	  institution	  or	  community	  are,	  as	  PULL	  (2009)	  highlights,	  completely	  different	  questions	  
that	  are	  much	  harder	  to	  answer.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  how	  different	  posts	  are	  to	  be	  weighted:	  is	  a	  dean’s	  job	  twice	  as	  important	  and/or	  twice	  as	  time-­‐consuming	  as	  a	  student	   dean’s	   job?	  What	  weight	   should	   be	   attached	   to	   the	   annual	   organization	   of	   an	  international	   scientific	   conference	   with	   100	   participants?	   What	   weight	   should	   be	   at-­‐tached	   to	   chairing	   the	   advisory	   board	   of	   a	   research	   institute?	  What	  weight	   should	   be	  attached	  to	  serving	  the	  scientific	  community	  by	  being	  an	  editor	  or	  a	  referee	  for	  a	  scien-­‐tific	  journal?2	  In	  all	  of	  these	  realms,	  we	  observe	  significant,	  and	  typically	  unpaid,	  invest-­‐ments	  in	  the	  public	  good.	  Can	  we	  assess	  the	  values	  of	  these	  investments?	  Can	  we	  assess	  them	  on	  the	  cost	  or	  input	  side	  (in	  terms	  of,	  for	  example,	  how	  much	  of	  a	  researcher’s	  own	  research	   is	   foregone	  while	   refereeing	  other	   researchers’	  papers)?	  Can	  we	  assess	   them	  on	  the	  outcome	  side?	  Are	  evaluation	  and	  appointment	  committees	  ready	  to	  honor	  these	  investments?	  If	  so,	  what	  value	  should	  be	  attached	  to	  these	  investments?	  As	  highlighted	  by	  PULL	  (2009),	  we	  are	  far	  from	  being	  able	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  but	  the	  personnel	  economics	  perspective	  helps	  us	  to	  ask	  the	  right	  questions.	  For	  those	  services	  to	  the	  sci-­‐entific	  community	  that	  are	  research-­‐related	  (e.g.,	  editing	  a	  scientific	  journal	  or	  referee-­‐ing	   papers),	   we	  might	   hope	   for	   complementarities	   (see	   above),	   but	   in	   those	   cases	   in	  which	  the	  services	  are	  not	  research-­‐related	  (e.g.,	  being	  a	  student	  dean),	  simply	  hoping	  for	  the	  jobs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  also	  for	  good	  jobs	  to	  be	  done	  might	  not	  be	  enough.	  As	   PULL	   (2009)	   highlights,	   there	   currently	   is	   intense	   discussion	   on	  how	   to	   adequately	  measure	  one	  outcome	  dimension:	  research.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  wrong	  to	  search	  for	  ade-­‐quate	  output	   indicators	  for	  research	  as	  one	  highly	  relevant	  outcome	  dimension	  in	  aca-­‐demia,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	   there	  are	  other	  outcomes	  as	  well	   and	   that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  job	  of	  a	  university	  professor	  than	  doing	  good	  and	  visible	  research.	  	  
3. From	  Output	  Indicators	  to	  Productivity:	  Accounting	  for	  Differing	  Inputs	  by	  Es-­‐
timating	  Frontier	  Production	  Functions	  and	  Applying	  DEA	  From	   a	   personnel	   economics	   perspective	   and	   from	   a	   public	   policy	   perspective,	   it	   is	  meaningless	   to	   assess	   output	   indicators	   irrespective	   of	   input.	   According	   to	   basic	   eco-­‐nomic	   theory,	   one	   instead	  must	   ask	  who	  produces	   the	   greatest	  output	   given	  a	   certain	  amount	  of	   input,	   or	  who	  produces	  a	   given	  amount	  of	  output	  with	   the	   least	   amount	  of	  input.	  Research	  rankings,	  for	  instance,	  that	  compare	  the	  publication	  output	  of	  individual	  researchers	   are	  meaningless	   if	   one	   does	   not	   at	   least	   take	   into	   account	   a	   researcher’s	  most	  fundamental	  resource:	  his	  or	  her	  career	  age	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  time	  (s)he	  has	  had	  to	  undertake	  the	  research	  and	  publish	  the	  results.	  Obviously,	  a	  65-­‐year-­‐old	  researcher	  has	   had	   much	   more	   time	   to	   undertake	   research	   and	   publish	   the	   findings	   than	   a	   re-­‐searcher	  who	  is	  20	  years	  younger.	  Still,	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  highly	  visible	  and	  influ-­‐ential	   rankings	   of	   individual	   researchers	   according	   to	   their	   absolute	   research	   output	  (number	  of	  publications	  in	  highly	  ranked	  journals,	  number	  of	  citations,	  etc.)	  without	  the	  (career)	  ages	  of	  the	  researchers	  being	  taken	  into	  account.	  In	  much	  the	  same	  vein,	  there	  are	  rankings	   that	  compare	  research	  output	  at	   the	  university	  department	   level	  without	  the	  number	  of	  researchers,	  as	  one	  basic	   input	  of	  research	  production,	  being	  controlled	  for,	   let	  alone	  financial	  or	  other	  resources.	  That	  is,	  what	  we	  actually	  measure	  in	  these	  –	  again,	   highly	   influential	   –	   rankings	   are	   size	   effects,	   but	   still	  we	   speak	   of	   assessing	   the	  comparative	  “research	  strength”	  of	  departments.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	   attempts	   to	   assess	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   teaching	   and	   services,	   see,	   e.g.,	   TAYLOR/FEN-­‐DER/BURKE	  (2006)	  and	  AGUINIS	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  
However,	  an	  individual’s	  resources	  for	  research	  can	  at	  best	  be	  proxied	  by	  a	  researcher’s	  career	   age,	   and	   a	  department’s	   resources	   can	   at	   best	   be	  proxied	   by	   the	  number	  of	   re-­‐searchers.	  A	  “market	  evaluation”	  of	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  alike	  would	  be	  preferable.	  If	  we	  had	  market	  values	   for	   inputs	  and	  outputs,	  we	  could	  calculate	  a	  parameter	  such	  as	  “re-­‐turn	  on	  investment”	  or	  “return	  on	  equity.”	  However,	  this	  type	  of	  calculation	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  achieve	  in	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  such	  as	  universities,	  where	  there	  are	  no	  reliable	  market	  evaluations.	  There	  are	  two	  tools	   in	  personnel	  and	  organization	  economics	   that	  have	  been	  used	  and	  further	  developed	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem	  of	  missing	   market	   prizes:	   frontier	   production	   functions	   and	   data	   envelopment	   analyses	  (DEA),	  both	  of	  which	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (1989)	  and	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/ZANDER	  (1989)	  used	  in	  a	  very	  early	  stage	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  It	  has	  taken	  quite	  some	  time	  for	  these	  instruments,	  and	  particularly	  DEA,	  to	  become	  more	  widely	  used,	  but	  they	  have	  become	  quite	  popular	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  in	  university	  research,	  particularly	  DEA	  (e.g.,	  OLIVARES	  2012,	  SCHEN-­‐KER-­‐WICKI/OLIVARES	  2009,	  UNGER/PULL/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  2010,	  WARNING	  2007).	  	  Let	  us	   first	  explain	  very	  briefly	  how	  efficiency	   is	  measured	   in	   this	  context	  and	  what	   it	  means.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  let	  us	  take	  a	  simple	  example	  with	  two	  inputs	  and	  one	  output.	  We	  have	   a	   number	   of	   departments,	   and	  we	  observe	  different	   combinations	   of	  input	  1	   (e.g.,	   the	  number	  of	   researchers	   in	   full-­‐time-­‐equivalents)	  and	   input	  2	   (e.g.,	   the	  financial	  resources	  available)	  being	  used	  to	  produce	  one	  unit	  of	  output	  (e.g.,	  the	  number	  of	  articles	   in	  A-­‐Journals).	  Using	   linear	  programming	   techniques,	  we	  can	  estimate	  a	   so-­‐called	   frontier	   production	   function	   representing	   all	   minimal	   possible	   combinations	   of	  inputs	  1	  and	  2	  that	  produce	  one	  unit	  of	  output.	  Relative	  efficiency	  is	  then	  calculated	  as	  the	  relative	  distance	  of	  a	  given	  input	  combination	  to	  the	  production	  frontier,	  i.e.,	  the	  best	  possible	   input	   combination.	   The	   efficiency	   standard	   is	   thus	   defined	   by	   the	   best-­‐practicing	  organizations	  in	  the	  sample	  and	  not	  by	  some	  theoretical	  or	  hypothetical	  con-­‐cept.	  	  
Data	  envelopment	  analysis	  basically	  performs	  the	  same	  function,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  used	  in	   the	   case	  of	  multiple	  outputs	   (e.g.,	   publication	  output	  and	   graduation	   rates)	   –	   again,	  even	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  market	  prices.	  DEA	  uses	  similar	  algorithms	  to	  estimate	  a	  “fron-­‐tier”	  production	  function	  (a	  function	  that	  envelops	  the	  data)	  and	  simultaneously	  deter-­‐mines	   organization-­‐specific	  weights	   for	   the	  multiple	   outputs.	   The	   appealing	   aspect	   of	  this	   simultaneous	  weighting	   procedure	   is	   that	   the	  weights	   are	   set	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	  every	   organization	   is	   seen	   through	   the	   most	   favorable	   lens	   possible.	   For	   example,	   if	  there	  is	  a	  university	  or	  a	  department	  that	  is	  strong	  in	  research,	  the	  respective	  university	  or	  department	  is	  assigned	  a	  large	  weight	  for	  research	  and	  is	  only	  compared	  with	  similar	  universities.	  A	  university	  or	  department	  that	  is	  good	  in	  teaching	  undergraduates,	  in	  con-­‐trast,	   is	  assigned	  a	  large	  weight	  for	  its	  undergraduate	  output	  variable	  and	  is	  compared	  only	  with	  the	  most	  similar	  universities	  or	  departments.	  	  What	  are	  the	  results	  of	  these	  types	  of	  analyses?	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (1989)	  finds	  a	  substan-­‐tial	  variation	   in	  research	  efficiency	  among	  German	  economics	  and	  business	  economics	  departments.	  Approximately	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  departments	  are	  at	  or	  very	  close	  to	  the	  efficient	  production	  function	  (90–100%).	  There	   is	  a	  strong	  middle	   field	  with	  efficiency	  degrees	  of	  between	  50	  and	  90%,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  a	  non-­‐negligible	  lower	  end	  with	  effi-­‐ciency	  degrees	  as	   low	  as	  “10%	  or	   less.”	  Of	  course,	   those	  at	   the	   lower	  end	   in	  particular	  argue	   that	   research	   is	  only	  part	  of	   the	  story:	   “if	  one	  would	  only	   take	   teaching	   into	  ac-­‐count,	   it	  would	  look	  quite	  different	  because	  this	   is	  what	  we	  are	  strong	  at.”	  In	  a	  further	  analysis,	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/ZANDER	  (1989)	  use	  DEA	  to	  consider	  multiple	  outputs.	  In	  addi-­‐tion	   to	  publications,	   they	  use	   the	  number	  of	  diplomas	  and	   the	  number	  of	  doctoral	  de-­‐grees	  granted	  by	  a	  department	  as	  two	  types	  of	  teaching	  indicators.	  However,	  the	  picture	  
does	  not	  change	  dramatically.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  more	  departments	  on	  the	  efficient	  fron-­‐tier,	  but	   there	   is	   still	   a	   range	  of	   inefficient	  departments.	  Thus,	   carefully	  accounting	   for	  outputs	  in	  relation	  to	  inputs	  is	  very	  important.	  
4. Selection	  and	  Self-­‐Selection:	  Intended	  and	  Unintended	  Effects	  	  When	  “personnel”	  is	  an	  organization’s	  most	  crucial	  asset,	  the	  question	  of	  selection	  and	  self-­‐selection	   becomes	   a	   central	   one.	   Selection	   and	   self-­‐selection	   processes	   are	   im-­‐portant	   sources	   of	   productivity	   because	   such	   (self-­‐)selection	   processes	   determine	   the	  productivity	  potential	  (cognitive	  and	  non-­‐cognitive	  skills)	  of	  those	  individuals	  who	  pur-­‐sue	  academic	  careers.	  The	  questions	  that	  arise	  are	  to	  what	  selection	  do	  university	  sys-­‐tems	  lead	  and	  what	  factors	  influence	  the	  (self-­‐)selection	  process?	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/SCHLINGHOFF	   (2002),	   for	   example,	   found	   empirically	   that	   in	   Germany,	  academics	  with	  higher	  research	  productivity	  and	  from	  a	  more	  prestigious	  university	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   appointed	   to	   chairs	   and	   to	   be	   granted	   tenure.	  Whereas	   the	   former	  hints	   at	   a	   successful	   positive	   (self-­‐)selection,	   the	   latter	  might	   be	   the	   result	   of	   positive	  (self-­‐)selection	   at	   an	   earlier	   career	   stage	   –	   at	  which	   only	   the	  most	   talented	   junior	   re-­‐searchers	  are	  accepted	  at	   the	  most	  prestigious	  universities	  –	  or	  a	  human	  capital	  effect	  whereby	  those	  who	  graduate	  from	  prestigious	  universities	  acquire	  more	  human	  capital	  in	  their	  early	  careers	  (see	  below).	  In	  much	  the	  same	  vein,	  CHLOSTA	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  empirically	  analyzed	  who	  leaves	  the	  acade-­‐mic	  system	  after	  having	  been	  on	  the	  academic	  track	  for	  some	  time.	  Using	  an	  original	  da-­‐ta	   set	   on	   junior	   researchers	  who	   originally	   intended	   to	   stay	   in	   academia,	   the	   authors	  found	  a	  young	  academic’s	  decision	  to	  leave	  the	  university	  system	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  following	  factors:	  the	  less	  successful	  the	  young	  researchers	  were	  in	  publishing	  their	  re-­‐sults,	  the	  less	  they	  enjoyed	  what	  they	  were	  doing,	  and	  the	  higher	  their	  time	  preference	  (measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  children)	  was,	  the	  higher	  the	  probability	  was	  that	  they	  left	  academia.	  That	  is,	  if	  one	  wants	  the	  high	  performers	  to	  stay	  in	  academia,	  one	  should	  en-­‐sure	  that	  they	  have	  opportunities	  to	  work	  on	  research	  questions	  in	  which	  they	  are	  inter-­‐ested	   (potentially	   increasing	   their	   intrinsic	  motivation	  and	  reducing	   their	  effort	   costs)	  and	  that	   they	  are	  paid	   in	  a	  way	  that	  enables	   them	  to	  earn	  a	  decent	   living	  and	  care	   for	  their	  families.	  Finally,	   in	   their	   recent	   analysis	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   childbearing	   in	   academia,	  JOECKS/PULL/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (2013)	  found	  evidence	  of	  self-­‐selection	  playing	  a	  significant	  role.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  raising	  children	  is	  time-­‐consuming	  (i.e.,	  reduces	  the	  availbable	  time	  for	  research),	  the	  authors	  report	  the	  somewhat	  counterintuitive	  result	  that	  female	  researchers	  with	  children	   in	  business	  and	  economics	  are	  more	  productive	   than	   female	  researchers	  without	  children.	  Hence,	  female	  researchers	  with	  children	  either	  manage	  to	  overcompensate	   for	   the	   negative	   resource	   effect	   associated	   with	   raising	   children	   by	  working	  even	  harder	  (positive	  incentive	  effect),	  or	  alternatively,	  only	  the	  most	  produc-­‐tive	   female	  researchers	  decide	  to	  pursue	  careers	   in	  academia	  and	  have	  children	  at	   the	  same	  time	  (positive	  self-­‐selection	  effect).	  The	  first	  descriptive	  evidence	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  parenthood	  hints	  at	  the	  latter	  being	  the	  case:	  only	  the	  most	  productive	  female	  research-­‐ers	  dare	  to	  have	  children	  and	  go	  for	  academic	  careers.	  	  In	  their	  personnel	  economics	  analysis,	  JOECKS/PULL/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (2013)	  hence	  show	  that	  naïve	  expectations	  might	  prove	   to	  be	  wrong:	  Whereas,	  naively,	   one	  would	  expect	  that	   female	   academics	   with	   children	   have	   lower	   research	   productivity	   as	   a	   result	   of	  childcare	   responsibilities,	   the	   empirical	   results	   show	   that	   female	   academics	   with	  childbearing	   responsibilities	   are	   more	   productive	   than	   comparable	   females	   without	  
children.	   Personnel	   economics	   theories	   help	   to	   explain	   this	   surprising	   result	   because	  they	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  self-­‐selection	  mechanisms.	  If,	  among	  female	  academics,	  only	   the	   high-­‐performers	   (high-­‐ability	   candidates)	   dare	   to	   go	   into	   academia	   and	   have	  children	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  their	  average	  productivity	  is	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  male	  academ-­‐ics	   because	   those	   females	   are	   drawn	   only	   from	   the	   upper	   part	   of	   the	   distribution,	  whereas	  male	  academics	  are	  also	  drawn	  from	  a	  large	  pool	  of	  “normally”	  talented	  candi-­‐dates	  and	  not	  just	  the	  upper	  tail	  of	  the	  distribution.3	  
5. Incentives:	  Pay	  for	  Performance	  vs.	  Career	  Incentives	  “Incentives	  are	  the	  essence	  of	  economics”	  –	  this	  often-­‐cited	  quote	  by	  PENDERGAST	  (1999)	  hints	   at	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   topic,	   also	   for	   the	   economic	   analysis	   of	   academia	   and	  higher	  education.	  The	  provision	  of	  incentives	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  new	  public	  management	  reforms	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  academic	  system.	  The	  idea	  of	  these	  reforms	  is	  (and	  this	  is	  what	  a	  naïve	  economics	  perspective	  might	  support)	  the	  following:	  if	  we	  do	  not	   provide	   explicit	   monetary	   incentives	   for	   tenured	   professors,	   they	   will	   not	   exert	  enough	  effort	  when	  undertaking	  research	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  an	   incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  often	  argued	  that,	  particularly	  in	  the	  traditional	  German	  universi-­‐ty	  system,	  there	  were	  no	  incentives	  to	  stay	  productive	  after	  tenure	  because	  income	  was	  not	  attached	  to	  individual	  performance.4	  A	  naïve	  conclusion	  that	  is	  occasionally	  drawn	  is	  that	   introducing	  performance	  pay	   in	   a	   professor’s	   compensation	  package	  would	   solve	  the	  problem.	  	  However,	   a	   sound	   personnel	   economics	   analysis	   questions	   this	   conclusion	   because	   it	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  incentives	  is	  neither	  the	  cause	  nor	  the	  cure	  for	  differences	  in	   research	  productivity.	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER	   (1993),	   for	   example,	   studied	   comparative	   re-­‐search	  productivity	  of	  US	  and	  German	  universities	  and	  showed	  that	   it	   is	  not	   the	  exist-­‐ence	  of	   pay-­‐for-­‐performance	   that	  distinguishes	   the	  best	  US	   research	  universities	   from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  but,	  rather,	  the	  differences	  in	  selection	  procedures,	  career	  patterns,	  teaching	   loads,	   academic	   culture,	   organizational	   strategies	   and,	   perhaps	   most	   im-­‐portantly,	  differences	  in	  the	  available	  resources.	  However,	   the	   fact	   that	   academic	   systems	  often	  do	  not	   rely	   on	  performance	  pay	   is	   not	  surprising	  given	  that	  personnel	  economics	  teaches	  us	  that	  in	  practice,	  incentives	  do	  not	  only	   come	   from	  pay-­‐for-­‐performance	  systems	  –	  as	  public	  opinion	  and	  political	  discus-­‐sions	  sometimes	  seem	  to	  assume.	  Rather,	   incentives	  –	  even	  in	  private	  companies	  –	  are	  very	  often	  set	  by	  career	  incentives	  (set	  up	  as	  a	  “tournament”	  in	  which	  it	  is	  relative	  per-­‐formance	   that	   counts,	   cf.	   BACKES-­‐GELLNER/PULL	   2008,	   2013).	   As	   personnel	   economic	  analyses	  show	  for	  universities,	  tournament	  incentives	  are	  often	  better	  suited	  for	  incen-­‐tive	  setting	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  and	  they	  are	  also	  empirically	  more	  important	  (see	  SCHLINGHOFF/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  2004	   for	  Germany	  or	  COUPÉ/SMEETS/WARZYNSKI	  2006	  for	  an	  international	  comparison).	  However,	  why	   should	   tournament	   incentives	   (i.e.,	   incentive	   systems	  based	  on	   relative	  performance)	  be	  better	  suited	  for	  universities	  than	  performance	  pay	  based	  on	  absolute	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	   Another	   explanation	   would	   be	   selection	   procedures	   that	   set	   higher	   performance	   thresholds	   for	   fe-­‐males	  with	   children	   because	   selection	   committees	  want	   to	   counterbalance	   the	   signal	   “childbearing”	  that	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  negative.	  If	  this	  is	  not	  assumed,	  self-­‐selection	  must	  be	  an	  important	  explana-­‐tion	  for	  a	  positive	  productivity	  differential	  for	  female	  academics	  with	  children.	  
4	  	   A	  simple	  plausibility	  check	  indicates	  that	  the	  naïve	  explanation	  does	  not	  hold.	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/SCHLING-­‐HOFF	   (2010)	   and	   SCHLINGHOFF	   (2003),	   for	   example,	   compared	   productivity	   profiles	   before	   and	   after	  tenure	  in	  the	  US	  in	  comparison	  to	  Germany	  and	  found	  that	  –	  if	  at	  all	  –	  a	  huge	  productivity	  drop	  after	  tenure	  occurs	  in	  the	  US	  and	  not	  in	  Germany.	  	  
performance	  measures?	  First	   and	   foremost,	   relative	  performance	   is	   easier	   to	  measure	  for	  complex	  and	  multidimensional	  tasks	  such	  as	  those	  performed	  by	  university	  profes-­‐sors	   (see	   above),	   and	   second,	   relative	   performance	  measures	   cancel	   out	   the	   common	  risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   output	   production	   of	   all	   contestants	   (see	   the	   seminal	   paper	   by	  LAZEAR/ROSEN	   1981).	   Furthermore,	   absolute	   performance	   pay	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	  whole	  set	  of	  problems	  that	  makes	  it	  less	  suitable	  in	  a	  university	  context.	  Personnel	  eco-­‐nomics	  shows,	  for	  example,	  that	  absolute	  performance	  pay	  causes	  problems	  as	  soon	  as	  performance	  measures	  are	  subject	   to	   large	  variations	  (e.g.,	  over	  time)	  and	  have	  a	  high	  external	   risk	   (MILGROM/ROBERTS	   1991),	   which	   is,	   for	   example,	   the	   case	   in	   publication	  processes	   that	   in	   some	   cases	   take	  many	  years	   and	  have	  a	   substantial	   random	  compo-­‐nent.5	   Therefore,	   it	   comes	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   for	   centuries,	   the	   university	   systems	   in	  many	  countries	   in	  Europe	  and	   in	  the	  US	  have	  relied	  much	  more	  on	  tournament	   incen-­‐tives	  then	  on	  pay	  for	  absolute	  performance.	  	  Empirical	  analyses	  have	  shown	  that	  tournament	  incentives	  work.	  For	  example,	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/SCHLINGHOFF	   (2010)	   report	   that	   in	   the	  German	  as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  US	  university	  system,	  the	  career	  steps	  leading	  to	  the	  first	  tenured	  position	  are	  designed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  creates	  effective	  incentives	  for	  an	  individual’s	  research	  productivity.	  After	  the	  first	  ten-­‐ured	  position,	  there	  are	  systematic	  differences	  between	  the	  German	  and	  the	  US	  systems:	  whereas	  in	  the	  German	  system,	  additional	  appointments	  bring	  only	  small	  monetary	  and	  non-­‐monetary	   gains	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   gains	   at	   the	   tenure	   level,	   in	   the	   US	   system,	  even	  after	  tenure,	  there	  are	  still	  effective	  incentives	  until	  a	  full	  professorship	  is	  reached.	  However,	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER/SCHLINGHOFF	  (2010)	  also	  report	  that	  after	  a	  full	  professorship	  is	  reached	  in	  the	  US	  system,	  incentives	  are	  very	  weak	  and	  cannot	  ensure	  a	  productivity	  level	   that	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   level	   before	   tenure	   or	   before	   promotion	   to	   full	   professor.	  Hence,	  the	  analyses	  indicate	  that	  incentives	  in	  the	  German	  and	  US	  systems	  function	  very	  similarly;	  they	  only	  last	  a	  little	  longer	  in	  the	  US	  than	  in	  Germany	  due	  to	  a	  second	  major	  career	  step	  not	  available	  in	  the	  German	  system.	  	  However,	   new	  public	  management	   reforms	   in	   recent	  decades	  have	  brought	   a	   shift	   to-­‐ward	  more	  elements	  of	  absolute	  performance	  incentives,	  such	  as	  bonuses	  for	  a	  certain	  number	   or	   quality	   of	   publications	   or	   the	   like.6	   CHLOSTA/PULL	   (2010)	   theoretically	   ana-­‐lyzed	  the	  effects	  of	  selected	  components	  of	  the	  reform	  in	  Germany	  on	  the	  existing	  (ca-­‐reer)	   incentives	   provided	   by	   the	   appointment	   system.	   In	   their	   analysis,	   CHLOSTA/PULL	  model	   the	  German	  appointment	   system	   in	  higher	  education	  as	  a	   tournament	   in	  which	  two	  types	  of	  contestants,	  professors	  and	  junior	  researchers,	  compete	  for	  a	  vacant	  chair	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	  among	  all	  economists	  and	  business	  economists	   in	  Germany,	   the	  average	  number	  of	  publications	  in	  top	  journals	  was	  0.1	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  century,	  which	  means	  only	  every	  tenth	  year	  can	  a	  researcher	  expect	  to	  publish	  an	  article	  in	  a	  top	  journal,	  or	  more	  likely,	  only	  every	  tenth	  professor	  produces	  a	  top	  article	  per	  year	  (BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  2004).	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  publications	  of	  Ger-­‐man	  researchers	   in	  top	  international	   journals,	   it	  becomes	  obvious	  how	  absurd	  the	  discussion	  in	  Ger-­‐man	  universities	  often	  is	  (at	  least	  in	  our	  fields,	  where	  top	  international	  publications	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  cri-­‐terion	  for	  every	  professor).	  Every	  1,000th	  professor	  has	  an	  article	  published	  in	  a	  top	  international	  jour-­‐nal	  in	  any	  given	  year,	  or	  every	  thousand	  years	  on	  average,	  we	  can	  expect	  to	  get	  a	  paper	  published	  in	  a	  top	  international	  journal.	  (To	  take	  such	  a	  measure	  to	  evaluate	  the	  performance	  of	  all	  professors	  alike	  seems	  like	  rolling	  dice.)	  
6	  	   As	  KRÄKEL/HARBRING/IRLENBUSCH	  (2004)	  argue,	  these	  absolute	  performance	  payments	  might,	  however,	  also	  entail	  a	  tournament	  component	  on	  the	  department	  level,	  as	  the	  budget	  for	  the	  performance	  pay-­‐ments	  in	  a	  given	  department	  is	  fixed.	  This	  new	  and	  additional	  tournament	  might	  have	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  career	  system	  because	  members	  of	  appointment	  committees	  might	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  appoint	  less	  able	  colleagues.	  Although	  these	  additional	  adverse	  effects	  cannot,	  in	  general,	  be	   excluded,	   there	   is	   good	   reason	   not	   to	   overestimate	   their	   adverse	   selection	   effects	   (see	   BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  2004).	  	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  past	  performance.	  CHLOSTA/PULL	  rely	  on	  a	  simple	  tournament	  model	  based	  on	  LAZEAR/ROSEN	  (1981)	  and	  introduce	  J-­‐curved	  effort	  cost	  functions	  in	  that	  base	  model	   structure,	   i.e.,	   they	   assume	   that	   researchers	  might	   in	   principle	   also	   enjoy	  what	  they	  do.	  By	  further	  taking	  into	  account	  systematic	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  different	  types	   of	   contestants,	   junior	   researchers	   and	   professors,	   they	   are	   able	   to	   explain	   that	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  variable	  payments,	  before	  the	  reform	  in	  2001,	  professors	  did	  not	  automatically	   “slack	   off”	   after	   their	   first	   appointment	   to	   a	   chair	   (see	   e.g.	   SCHLINGHOFF	  2003,	  RAUBER/URSPRUNG	  2006	  and	  WOLF/ROHN/MACHARZINA	  2006).	  	  Theoretically	  analyzing	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  selected	  elements	  of	  the	  2001	  reform	  of	  the	  system	  of	  German	  higher	  education	  on	   the	   tournament	   incentives	  provided	  by	   the	  appointment	   system,	   CHLOSTA/PULL	   (2010)	   distinguish	   three	   different	   effects:	   a	   prize	  
effect	  (resulting	  from	  a	  variation	  of	  tournament	  prize	  spans),	  an	  effort	  cost	  effect	  (creat-­‐ed	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  junior	  professor)	  and	  a	  heterogeneity	  effect	  (arising	  from	  an	  asymmetric	  variation	  in	  tournament	  prizes	  and	  effort	  cost	  function	  pa-­‐rameters	   through	  various	   reform	  elements,	   as	  well	   as	   from	  a	   variation	   in	   “handicaps”	  implicitly	  set	  by	  appointment	  committees).	  Concerning	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  the	  selected	  el-­‐ements	  of	  the	  2001	  reform,	  it	  is	  a	  priori	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  career	  incentives	  will	  in-­‐crease	  or	  decrease	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reform.	  As	  adverse	  effects	  on	  career	  incentives	  gen-­‐erally	  cannot	  be	  excluded,	  the	  burden	  for	  a	  successful	  reform	  rests	  on	  the	  intended	  posi-­‐tive	   incentive	   effects	   connected	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   variable	   pay	   components	   –	   a	  reform	  element	  that	  is	  implemented	  only	  gradually	  and	  rather	  hesitantly.	  	  Furthermore,	  one	  has	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  adding	  pay	  for	  performance	  as	  a	  further	  in-­‐centive	  (on	  top	  of	  the	  existing	  career	  incentives)	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  “perverted”	  incen-­‐tives	   leading	  to	  researchers	  manipulating	  and	  “gaming”	  the	  system,	  e.g.,	  by	  duplicating	  publications	  or	  by	  plagiarism	  –	  both	  of	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  some	  very	  recent	  cases	  in	  business	  and	  economics.	  Thus,	  absolute	  performance	  pay	  schemes,	  according	  to	  per-­‐sonnel	   economics	   analyses,	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   the	   best	   cure	   for	   alleged	   productivity	  problems	  in	  universities.	  Overall,	   the	  empirical	  results	  suggest	   that	  different	   incentives	  cannot	  explain	   the	   large	  productivity	  differences	  between,	  for	  example,	  top	  US	  universities	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  German	  universities	  on	  the	  other.	  Thus,	  although	  the	  omnipresence	  of	  incentives	  in	  the-­‐ories	  and	  political	  discussions	  might	  suggest	  that	  potentially	  low	  research	  productivity	  is	  basically	  the	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  incentives,	  personnel	  economics	  and	  classical	  business	  economics	  theories	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  differences	  in	  production	  technology,	   in	  available	  resources	  such	  as	  financial	  capital	  and	  –	  since	  BECKER	  (1967)	  –	  human	  capital.	  	  
6. Drivers	  of	  Productivity:	  Human,	  Social	  and	  Organizational	  Capital	  as	  Relevant	  
Resources	  If	  it	  is	  not	  only	  incentives,	  what	  is	  it	  that	  drives	  research	  performance?	  The	  literature	  on	  the	   determinants	   of	   research	   productivity	   has	   identified	   a	  whole	   set	   of	   variables	   that	  influence	  publication	  output,	  such	  as	  individual	  demographics,	  organizational	  variables	  and	  collaboration,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  clearly	  related	  to	  human,	  social	  and	  organizational	  capital.	  
Human	  and	  Social	  Capital	  Human	  and	  social	  capital	  might	  be	  assessed	  by	  very	  different	  means.	  One	  first	  and	  obvi-­‐ous	  channel	  by	  which	  human	  and	  social	  capital	  might	  be	  transferred	  is	  through	  the	  aca-­‐
demic	  advisor:	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  repeatedly,	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  relation	  between	  advisor	  
and	   student	   research	   productivity	   (see,	   e.g.,	   LONG/MCGINNIS	   1985,	   WILLIAMSON/CABLE	  2003,	  HILMER/HILMER	  2007,	  FIEDLER	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Although	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  it	   is	  not	   clear	  whether	  we	  should	  expect	   the	   relation	  between	  student	  and	  advisor	   re-­‐search	  productivity	   to	   be	   generally	   positive	   (it	  might	  well	   be	   that	   very	  productive	   re-­‐searchers	  find	  no	  time	  to	  adequately	  supervise	  their	  student	  researchers),	  the	  empirical	  findings	  in	  fact	  hint	  at	  a	  consistently	  positive	  relation	  between	  the	  two.	  As	  highlighted	  by	  BREUNINGER/PFERDMENGES/PULL	  (2012),	  this	  positive	  relation	  between	  student	  and	  advi-­‐sor	  research	  productivity	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  joint	  result	  of	  a	  set	  of	  diverse	  mechanisms:	  (a)	  advisors	  passing	  on	   their	  human	  capital	   to	   their	  students,	   (b)	  advisors	   introducing	  their	  students	  into	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  hence	  endowing	  them	  with	  social	  capi-­‐
tal	  and	  (c)	   the	  more	  productive	  advisors	  being	  able	  to	  attract	   the	  more	  able	  and	  more	  productive	  doctoral	  and	  postdoctoral	  students	  (self-­‐selection).	   In	   their	  empirical	  analy-­‐sis,	  BREUNINGER/PFERDMENGES/PULL	   (2012)	   found	   the	  positive	   relation	  between	  advisor	  and	  student	  research	  productivity	  to	  hold	  on	  a	  group	  level	  as	  well	  –	  i.e.,	  for	  doctoral	  stu-­‐dents	  in	  research	  training	  groups	  (Graduiertenkollegs	  financed	  by	  the	  German	  Research	  Foundation,	  DFG)	  and	  the	  respective	  group	  of	  principal	  investigators.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   academic	   advisor,	   there	  might	   be	   other	  mentors	  who	   play	   roles	   in	  providing	   human	   and,	   perhaps	   to	   an	   even	   greater	   extent,	   social	   capital.	   As	   MU-­‐SCHALLIK/PULL	  (2013)	  show	  with	  the	  help	  of	  an	  original	  data	  set	  of	  about	  400	  researchers	  in	  economics	  and	  business	  administration,	  participants	   in	   formal	  mentoring	  programs	  are	  more	  productive	   in	   terms	  of	  publication	  output	   than	   their	  non-­‐participating	  coun-­‐terparts	  (see	  BLAU et al. 2010 and GARDINER	  et	  al.	  2007	   for	  similar	  results).	  Accounting	  for	   a	   potential	   process	   of	   self-­‐selection	   via	   matching	   techniques,	   MUSCHALLIK/PULL	  (2013)	   found	  this	  result	   to	  be	  robust.	  That	   is,	   formal	  mentoring	  programs	  seem	  to	  en-­‐hance	  mentee	  research	  productivity	  (arguably	  by	  enhancing	  mentees’	  human	  and	  social	  capital).	  Informal	  mentoring	  relationships,	  however,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  affect	  mentees’	  pub-­‐lication	  performance.	  	  Furthermore,	  human	  and	  social	  capital	  might	  also	  be	  enhanced	  via	  national	  or	  interna-­‐tional	  mobility.	  Indeed,	  BREUNINGER	  (2013)	  finds	  that	  research	  stays	  abroad	  are	  associat-­‐ed	  with	  increased	  publication	  output	  (for	  a	  similar	  finding	  of	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  stays	  abroad	   on	   appointment	   success,	   see	   SCHULZE/WARNING/WIERMANN	   2008).	   According	   to	  BÄKER	  (2013),	  national	  changes	  of	  affiliation	  might	  also	   lead	  to	  an	   improvement	   in	   the	  publication	  record.7	   In	  both	  studies,	  potential	   (self-­‐)selection	  effects	  are	  addressed	  via	  (propensity	  score)	  matching	  techniques.	  	  
Organizational	  Capital	  Although	   the	   analysis	   of	   individual	   characteristics	   is	   important	   in	   a	   research	   context,	  simply	  measuring	  and	  comparing	  research	  productivity	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  is	  not	  suf-­‐ficient	  from	  a	  business	  economist’s	  or	  personnel	  economist’s	  point	  of	  view	  because	  the	  productivity	  of	  an	  organization	  is	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  individual	  productivities.	  Due	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	   BÄKER	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  further	  analyzed	  whether	  and	  how	  academic	  mobility	  (national	  and	  international)	  relates	   to	   a	   researcher’s	   appointment	   success.	   Specifically,	   they	   asked	  whether	  mobility	   serves	   as	   a	  (positive	   or	   negative)	   signal	   to	   appointment	   committees.	   In	   their	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   a	   data	   set	   of	  about	  250researchers	   from	  business	   and	  economics,	   they	  measured	  appointment	   success	  by	   (a)	   the	  time	  required	  for	  the	  researcher	  to	  obtain	  tenure	  and	  (b)	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  appointing	  institution.	  Applying	  Cox	  proportional	  hazard	  regressions	  and	  logit	  analyses,	  they	  found	  that	  researchers’	  interna-­‐tional	  mobility—depending on the length of the stay abroad—reduces the time until the researcher gets ten-
ure and increases the likelihood of getting tenure at a highly ranked institution. To the contrary, a research-
er’s previous change in affiliation (national mobility) is associated with a longer time to tenure, and it might 
also adversely affect his or her chances to get tenure at a top ranked institution.	  
complementarities	  and	  economies	  of	  scope,	  the	  most	  productive	  research	  organization	  is	  most	  likely	  one	  with	  a	  well-­‐assembled	  team	  of	  people	  who	  practice	  a	  successful	  divi-­‐sion	  of	  labor.	  Therefore,	  research	  productivity	  should	  be	  measured	  on	  an	  organizational	  level,	   such	   as	   departments,	   institutes,	   graduate	   schools	   or	   even	   universities	   (if	   differ-­‐ences	  in	  fields	  are	  controlled	  for),	  and	  explanations	  for	  differences	  in	  research	  produc-­‐tivity	  should	  also	  be	  sought	  on	  an	  organizational	  level.	  	  Because,	   as	   argued	   above,	   individual	   talents	   are	   important	   prerequisites	   for	   research	  productivity,	   the	   selection	   and	   socialization	   procedures	   implemented	   by	   a	   particular	  organization	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  the	  organization’s	  research	  efficiency.	  In	  this	  con-­‐text,	  empirical	  results	  show,	  for	  example,	  that	  academic	  socialization	  by	  means	  of	  work-­‐ing	  together	  to	  coauthor	  articles	  is	  one	  way	  to	  increase	  the	  overall	  productivity	  of	  a	  de-­‐partment.	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (1989)	  shows	  that	   the	  higher	   the	  share	  of	  publications	  pub-­‐lished	  in	  co-­‐authorship	  is,	  the	  higher	  research	  productivity	  is	  (i.e.,	  the	  number	  of	  publi-­‐cations	   given	  a	   fixed	  number	  of	   researchers).8	  According	   to	  personnel	   economics,	   this	  finding	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   three	   effects:	   (a)	   via	   (early)	   co-­‐authorships	   and	   (young)	  scholars	   being	   socialized	   toward	   giving	  publication	  production	   a	   high	  priority,	   (b)	   via	  peer	  pressure	  and	  mutual	  monitoring	  and	  (c)	  via	  more	  efficient	  production	  technologies,	  i.e.,	  with	  coauthors	  effectively	  using	  advantages	  of	  specialization,	  complementarities	  and	  economies	  of	  scope.	  	  Another	  source	  of	  increased	  productivity	  potential	  in	  an	  organization	  is	  the	  composition	  of	   the	  organization’s	  employees.	  From	  a	   theoretical	  perspective,	  a	  more	  diverse	  work-­‐force	  may	  mean	   additional	   sources	   of	   knowledge	   and	   creativity,	  which,	   in	   turn,	  might	  lead	   to	   additional	   or	   better	   research	   outcomes.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   increased	   diversity	  goes	   together	  with	  more	   severe	   coordination	   and	   communication	   problems;	   thus,	   the	  optimal	   level	   of	   diversity	   is	   not	   the	  maximum	   level.	   Referring	   to	   the	  work	   by	   LAZEAR	  (1999),	   PULL/UNGER/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	   (forthcoming)	   analyzed	   the	   effect	   of	   interdiscipli-­‐narity	  and	  internationality	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  research	  training	  groups.	  Using	  seem-­‐ingly	  unrelated	   regressions,	  PULL/UNGER/BACKES-­‐GELLNER	   found	   for	   the	  humanities	  and	  social	   sciences	   that	   heterogeneity	   has	   significant	   effects	   on	   performance,	   with	   study	  field	  heterogeneity	   enhancing	   scientific	   visibility	   (in	   terms	  of	   an	  enhanced	  publication	  output)	   and	   the	   internationality	   of	   the	   group	   being	   inversely	   hump-­‐shaped	   related	   to	  the	   doctoral	   completion	   rate.	   In	   contrast,	   for	   the	   natural	   and	   life	   sciences,	   they	   only	  found	  a	  significant	  effect	  for	  the	  doctoral	  completion	  rate	  exhibiting	  a	  hump-­‐shaped	  re-­‐lationship	  with	  study	  field	  heterogeneity.	  What	  may	  work	  well	  in	  one	  disciplinary	  field	  may	  have	   the	  opposite	   effect	   in	   another.	  An	   increasing	  degree	  of	   interdisciplinarity	   in	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  positively	  affects	  research	  performance.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	   the	   degree	   of	   interdisciplinarity	   in	   the	   natural	   and	   life	   sciences	   increases,	  positive	  effects	  on	  research	  performance	  can	  only	  be	  observed	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  point	  and	  not	  if	  interdisciplinarity	  is	  driven	  to	  the	  extreme.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  con-­‐clude	  that	   in	  governing	  research	  groups,	  all	   types	  of	  external	  governance	  should	  be	  ei-­‐ther	   precisely	   customized	   to	   the	   disciplinary	   field	   concerned	   or	   a	   menu	   of	   options	  should	  be	  offered	  that	  allows	  research	  teams	  to	  choose	  a	  structure	  that	  is	  most	  effective	  given	  the	  specificities	  of	  their	  disciplinary	  fields	  and	  specific	  research	  requirements.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  productivity	  potential	  of	  an	  organization	  associated	  with	  its	  individual	  researchers,	  i.e.	  its	  human	  capital,	  an	  organization’s	  financial	  capital	  and	  other	  resources	  are	   also	   important	   drivers	   of	   research	   productivity.	   In	   this	   context,	   empirical	   results	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  	   Because	  publications	  in	  joint	  authorships	  are	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  authors	  before	  they	  enter	  the	  publication	  data	  base,	  this	  result	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  statistical	  artifact	  but,	  rather,	  reflects	  a	  true	  productiv-­‐ity	  increase.	  
reported	   by	   BACKES-­‐GELLNER	   (1989,	   1993),	   for	   example,	   show	   that	   the	  more	   students	  there	   are	   in	   a	   department,	   the	   higher	   the	   department’s	   research	   efficiency	   is,	   which	  sounds	  somewhat	  counterintuitive	   if	  students	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  burden	  for	  research.	  How-­‐ever,	  the	  result	  becomes	  less	  questionable	  if	  it	  is	  interpreted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  personnel	  economics,	  which	  suggests	  considering	  students	  also	  as	  an	  input	  to	  the	  research	  produc-­‐tion	  process.	  Why	  is	  this	  the	  case?	  First,	  a	  larger	  student	  pool	  allows	  for	  a	  better	  selec-­‐tion	  of	  young	  researchers.	  Second,	  departments	  with	  more	  students	  are	  typically	  grant-­‐ed	  more	  financial	  resources,	  which	  will	  be	  used	  for	  teaching	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  may	  be	  used	   for	   research-­‐oriented	   teaching	   and	   research	   personnel,	   thereby	   increasing	   re-­‐search	   resources.	   This	   logic	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   findings	   by	   BACKES-­‐GELLNER	   (1992)	  and	   BACKES-­‐GELLNER/ZANDER	   (1989)	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   student	   numbers	   on	   research	  productivity	  also	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  curriculum	  is	  structured,	  i.e.,	  on	  the	  relative	  num-­‐ber	  of	  undergraduate	  and	  graduate	  courses	  a	  department	  offers.	  The	  number	  of	  under-­‐graduate	   courses	   is	   negatively	   correlated	  with	   research	   efficiency,	   but	   the	   number	   of	  graduate	  courses	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  research	  efficiency.	  Thus,	  teaching	  a	  larg-­‐er	   number	   of	   undergraduates	   diverts	   time	   and	   effort	   away	   from	   research,	   whereas	   a	  larger	  number	  of	  graduate	  courses	  or	  teaching	  more	  graduates	  actually	  is	  an	  additional	  resource	  for	  or	  a	  byproduct	  of	  research.	  BACKES-­‐GELLNER	  (1992)	  found	  similar	  patterns	  in	  US	  universities,	  albeit	  on	  a	  very	  different	  scale.	   In	  the	  US,	   the	  best	  universities	  have	  budgets	  per	  student	  that	  are	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  best	  German	  universities.	  	  
7. Conclusion:	  What	  are	  the	  Lessons	  to	  be	  Learned	  for	  Higher	  Education	  Policy?	  Overall,	  empirical	  analyses	  from	  a	  personnel	  economics	  perspective	  show	  that	  research	  efficiency	   is	   influenced	   by	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   with	   similar	   effects	   across	   countries:	  (self-­‐)selection	  procedures	  that	  ensure	  a	  pool	  of	  very	  talented	  researchers,	  socialization	  procedures	   that	   lead	   to	   researchers	   pursuing	   the	   same	   goals,	   financial	   resources	   and	  graduate	   students	   that	   complement	   individual	   research	   efforts.	   Hence,	   organizational	  strategies	  and	  resources	  do	  matter	  for	  research	  efficiency,	  even	  if,	  in	  the	  end,	  a	  research	  paper	  can	  only	  be	  written	  by	  one	  or	  more	  individuals.	  Selection	  and	  resource	  effects	  ap-­‐parently	  matter	   as	  much	   as	   incentive	   effects.	   Tournament	   incentives	   seem	   to	   be	  well	  suited	   for	   research	   environments,	   but	   incentives	   are	  not	   all	   that	  matters.	   From	  a	  per-­‐sonnel	  economics	  perspective,	   the	  public	  discussion	   in	  recent	  decades	   that	  has	  mainly	  focused	  on	  incentives	  and	  pay	  for	  performance	  seems	  to	  have	  gone	  in	  the	  wrong	  direc-­‐tion.	   Resources,	   socialization,	   self-­‐selection	   and	   selection	   procedures	   should	   receive	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  future.	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